We read and hear dubious figures of Syrian annual births in Lebanon, some of which claim that they have crossed the 300,000 births per year mark, whereas in fact they are under 24,000, according to the UNHCR Data – constituting a departure from reality by a factor of 12, with all its ensuing demography-related panic. We also hear that all Syrians present in Lebanon are trained to use arms and can take control of the Lebanese territory, contradicting or denying statistical data that show that 80% of Syrians registered with the UNHCR are women and children.
Others aim to generalize. All Syrians have become shopkeepers and professionals who vie with the Lebanese for their livelihoods. In fact, a small number of Syrians, i.e. under 6%, have opened small businesses to earn their living, and a small number of them work in the liberal profession, according to the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon in 2016. Trivializing the humanitarian aspect of the refugee crisis, some assert that the majority of Syrians engage in selling the aid they receive and that they are constantly moving between their country of origin and their places of refuge. The reality, however, shows that vast majority of Syrians in Lebanon have fled violence of a scale that has rarely been seen before, with 71% living in poverty, according to the UNHCR, in debt to their relatives and Lebanese hosts, and struggling daily to provide for themselves and put food on the table for their families.
Very often, exaggeration and generalization are combined to create a recipe for disaster that promotes a narrative stirring up the demography-related phobia of certain Lebanese communities, imparts the imagination of the Lebanese regarding the invasion of an armed group to their community during the civil war, and resorts to fear mongering in relation to the Syrians by exaggerating their rivalry and competition with the Lebanese for their livelihoods. This story is complemented by stoking «terror» – a term used by a rising newspaper and republished by a leading television station – and using expressions such as explosion, time bombs and extinction – as insinuated in the headline of another prestigious newspaper.
It is very important to steer the debate back on the right course, away from populist agitation, exclusionary discourse and political stances that incite the masses and lay the groundwork for xenophobia and the rejection of Syrians and any ‘other’ who is not like ‘us’. The approach to this issue should rather be scientific and professional, resorting to targeted strategies based on the local context and an outlook built on knowledge and reality. This is the role that the Government of Lebanon should play as part of a clear vision to take charge of this ‘file’ and find solutions; something that is still largely absent from its agenda.
This approach should begin by surveying and understanding the local context of the geography of Syrian displacement to Lebanon. Only then would we get a complete picture that most Syrians, who are poor and destitute, live in the poorest regions, towns and suburbs of Lebanon. They rent modest houses and work in the sectors they have been used to working in before the crisis, such as construction, agriculture and other jobs that the Lebanese have abandoned and entrusted to poor workers from other countries, with the number of Syrian entering workforce having increased following the crisis. These host communities, as the UN refers to them, were underprivileged to start with, and historically forgotten by the Lebanese «center» and its institutions. The vulnerability of the local economy and the lack of opportunities in the Bekaa, North, South, and the suburbs of Beirut and Tripoli are not something new, but they have been exposed and foregrounded by the influx of a large number of Syrian refugees.
Our outlook should also be based on scientific facts and statistics, and, as already mentioned, based on an understanding of the local context, so that an outlook based on knowledge and a historical analysis of the political economy of these geographies of displacement will help us determine the actual reality of the crisis and the possible scenarios. The most important of which is perhaps assessing the economic and social fault lines in refugee host communities that are likely to emerge if they remain overlooked by policymakers.
The most prominent fault lines are likely to emerge among younger age groups that do not have university or vocational education. These fault lines are likely to deepen as a result of increased competition for jobs that are already lacking or non-existent. Throughout their history, the state institutions in Lebanon have not accorded systematic and serious attention to the issue of job creation for young people, especially in the disadvantaged areas currently hosting Syrians. Maybe the little statistical data available can illustrate the heart of the problem. Of the 23,000 jobs Lebanon needs each year, only 3,400 jobs are created as per the World Bank, the reality that leads to the migration of many young people, especially the educated, constituting a great loss for Lebanon in human capital. The lack of jobs drives many young people to work in the informal sector, with half of Lebanon’s active population working without a contract or social security. This situation has been compounded by the entry of a large number of Syrian young people into the labor market at an early age as a result of school dropouts and their need to support their families financially or provide for them.
One of the likely social consequences of this fault line is the risk of tension between young people (Lebanese and Syrians, Syrians and Palestinians, Syrians and Syrians etc..). A feeling of fierce competition for the few job opportunities would be the breeding ground for friction and clashes. What is most dangerous is the stoking of this feeling with racist rhetoric blaming the refugees and referring to them as «livelihood robbers». This sense of insecurity may increase the hostility of Syrians and lead to violence in some, which has already begun to appear in some areas and neighborhoods and even on social networks, where verbal abuse and hostility are widespread and uninhibited by any ethical controls.
Solutions
1 - Reduce tensions by steering the debate to policy issues away from narrow politics. The political exploitation of the Syrian refugee issue will only lead to more tensions. Populist exploitation of the Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon could win some parliamentary seats, but it would open up the country to civil and regional crises.
2 - Education first and foremost: The prevention of school dropouts for Syrian and Lebanese children (although the dropouts figure is lower for the Lebanese) fulfils various objectives, the most important of which is the provision of education for children and young people as their right in the hope that they would pursue a university or vocational education, and as a means of keeping them away from the dangers of early child labor and its effects on them and their communities.
3 - Launching and promoting joint economic projects between Syrian and Lebanese investors in the communities hosting the largest numbers of refugees would create jobs for all Lebanese, Syrians and Palestinians, boost the local economy, and contribute to its prosperity through productive projects.
Anticipating the future by delving into and trying to understand the fault lines that have begun to emerge, targeting their manifestations through programs and projects with clearly set goals within the local geographical context of refugee host communities, keeping the issue away from the narrow Lebanese political game, and steering clear of populist discourse that blames everything that is negative on refugees, opens up the horizon for finding serious solutions to the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon.